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I. INTRODUCTION
Behold, thou shalt conceive, and bear a son; and now drink no strong wine
or strong drink . . . 2
This Biblical verse illustrates that the societal proscription against pregnant
women drinking alcohol is centuries old. The recent tragedy is that substance abuse
among pregnant women has dramatically increased to the point that prenatal alcohol
and drug abuse is a serious public health problem. In 2001, the United States
Supreme Court noted that the “problem of crack babies was perceived in the late
1980’s as a national epidemic, promoting considerable concern both in the medical

1

Associate Dean for Student Affairs and George H. Mahon Professor of Law, Texas Tech
University School of Law.
2

Judges 13:7, THE BIBLE, King James Version.
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community and among the general populace.”3 According to a study released by the
National Institute on Drug Abuse, five percent of the four million women who gave
birth in the United States in 1992 used illegal drugs during their pregnancy.4
“Studies have concluded that the problem is pervasive, affecting deliveries in both
public health clinics and private obstetric practices, without regard for
socioeconomic classifications.”5
The problem has captured the attention of medical professionals, legislators,
prosecutors, journalists, and legal scholars. A number of law review articles discuss
issues related to maternal substance abuse. The majority of these articles fall into
two general categories. The first group emphasizes the harms of substance abuse
and the need for criminal or civil commitment statutes to curb illegal drug use by
pregnant women.6 The second category of commentaries focuses on a woman’s
constitutional rights and the dangers of state intervention.7 Many of the articles also
address the issue of recognition of fetal rights and potential conflicts between the
3

Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70, note 1 (2001). In Ferguson, ten women
challenged a state hospital policy that subjected some pregnant women to mandatory testing
for cocaine. Id. at 73. Under the policy, pregnant women who tested positive for cocaine had
an option to receive drug treatment or to be arrested. Id. at 72. The general question that the
Court decided was whether the State hospital’s performance of a diagnostic test to obtain
evidence of a patient’s criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes is an unreasonable
search when the patient does not consent to the procedure. Id. at 69-70. The majority
concluded that without patient consent, the searches were unreasonable in view of the law
enforcement focus of the policy to arrest and prosecute drug abusing mothers. Id. at 81-86.
According to the majority, the State interest in using the threat of criminal sanctions to deter
pregnant women from using cocaine could not justify a departure from the general rule
requiring a valid warrant for nonconsensual searches. Id. at 84-85.
4
Robert Mathias, NIDA Survey Provides First National Data on Drug Use During
Pregnancy, (Jan. 1995) available at http://www.nida.nih.gov/NIDA_Notes/NNVol10N1/
NIDASurvey.html. Marijuana and cocaine were the most frequently used illegal drugs, with
2.9% of the respondents reporting that they used marijuana, and 1.1% reporting that they used
cocaine at some time during their pregnancies. This study was based on a survey of selfreported data from a 1992 national sample of women who gave birth in urban and rural
hospitals in the United States.
5

James Denison, The Efficacy and Constitutionality of Criminal Punishment for Maternal
Substance Abuse, 64 S. CAL. L. REV. 1103, 1110 (1991) (noting that some reports reveal a
higher concentration in inner cities with the highest cocaine incidence occurring among
African-Americans).
6

See, e.g., Jacqueline Berrien, Pregnancy and Drug Use: The Dangerous and Unequal
Use of Punitive Measures, 2 YALE J. L. & FEMINISM 239 (1990) (questioning the punitive
approach to the problem of prenatal drug use); Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts
Who Have Babies: Women of Color, Equality and the Right of Privacy, 104 HARV. L. REV.
1419 (1991) (analyzing the disparate impact of criminalization on women of color).
7

See, e.g., Denise K. Cahalane, Court-Ordered Confinement of Pregnant Women, 15 NEW
ENG. J ON CRIM. & CIV. Confinement 203 (1989) (proposing that the government intervene
and order confinement for the sake of a viable fetus); Heather M. White, Unborn Child: Can
You Be Protected? 22 U. RICH. L REV. 285 (1988) (arguing that the unborn is a person entitled
to legal protection and that the pregnant woman’s right to privacy and liberty must yield to the
government action if intervention is necessary to prevent serious injury or to save the life of
the unborn child).
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mother’s rights and fetal rights.8 Various authors oppose government intervention,
cautioning that such intervention would lead to the recognition of fetal rights at the
expense of women’s right to privacy and personal autonomy.9
This article takes a different approach in considering the problem of prenatal
drug abuse.10 After briefly discussing government intervention and constitutional
issues, this article will consider the concept of duty and correlative rights. This
discussion of duty and correlative rights suggests that the government can take
measures to curb prenatal drug use without recognizing fetal rights. The article
concludes with a discussion of the utility of criminal legislation as compared to
public health legislation that treats drug addiction as a disease requiring treatment.
As formulated, the proposal for public health legislation is not based on any concept
of fetal rights. Instead, it is based on the recognition of societal interests, as well as
the woman’s needs.
II. THE APPROPRIATENESS AND OBJECTIVES OF GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION
A. Effects of Prental Drug Use
An evaluation of government intervention to curb prenatal drug use requires a
basic understanding of the effects of drug use by pregnant women. Given the
maternal-fetal link, drugs such as cocaine directly and indirectly affect the fetus from
conception to birth.11 “By depriving the fetus of oxygen, cocaine use threatens fetal
development.”12 Because cocaine freely crosses the placental barrier to the fetus and
cannot re-circulate back across the placental barrier into the mother’s bloodstream,
the fetus may become much more severely addicted than the mother.13

8
See, e.g., Louise B. Wright, Fetus v. Mother: Criminal Liability for Maternal Substance
Abuse, 36 WAYNE L. REV. 1285 (1990) (discussing the conflict between the constitutional
right of the fetus to life and the mother’s constitutional rights to privacy and control over her
own body).
9
See, e.g., Caroline S. Palmer, The Risks of State Intervention in Preventing Prenatal
Alcohol Abuse and the Viability of An Inclusive Approach: Arguments for Limiting Punitive
and Coercive Prenatal Alcohol Abuse Legislation in Minnesota, 10 HASTINGS L. J. 287 (1999);
Lynn Paltrow, Pregnant Drug Users, Fetal Persons, and the Threat to Rowe v. Wade, 62 ALB.
L. REV. 999 (1999).
10

For the purposes of this article, the term “drug” designates illegal substances, not alcohol
and prescribed medications. Although gestational alcohol abuse (GAS) is very serious and
widespread, this article does not discuss that problem. Legislation targeting GAS is more
complicated than intervention targeting illegal drug use by pregnant women because imbibing
alcohol is legal.
11

Joyce Lind Terres, Prenatal Cocaine Exposure: How Should the Government Intervene,
18 AM. J. CRIM. L. 61, 64 (1990) (reviewing the physiological impact that the mother’s drug
use has on the fetus).
12
Kristen Lichtenberg, Gestational Substance Abuse: A Call for a Thoughtful Response, 65
WASH. L. REV. 377, 379 (1990) (citing Chavez, Mulinare & Codero, Maternal Cocaine Use
During Pregnancy as a Risk Factor for Congenital Urogenital Anomalies, 262 JAMA 795,
798 (1989)).
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Malformations of urogenital, cardiac and central nervous systems can also result
from gestational cocaine abuse. “Neurological problems caused by cocaine can
permanently affect motor skills, reflexes and coordination.”14 Cocaine-addicted
women experience complications during labor and delivery15 and deliver infants preterm (less than 37 weeks gestation).16 These babies are born with lower birth
weights, shorter body lengths, and smaller head circumferences as compared to drugfree babies.17 Physicians consider these babies to be medically at risk.18
After birth, the infants experience acute withdrawal from the drug. This
withdrawal persists in a sub-acute form for four to six months after birth.19 As a
result of these complications, these infants need intensive medical care estimated to
cost approximately $100,000 per infant.20 A 1992 study estimated that the direct
costs related to prenatal drug exposure were $387 million.21 These figures do not
reflect the costs of the long-term effects of prenatal drug exposure.22
B. Objectives of and Basis for Government Intervention
Prosecutors and others have articulated a number of reasons that justify
government intervention to curb prenatal drug use. The most common reason given
is to protect the unborn child of the addicted mother.23 Presumably, early
intervention such as commitment or incarceration might also protect the mother.
A number of commentators and medical professionals have criticized this
position, arguing that criminal legislation has the opposite effect of deterring women
13

Michelle D. Wilkins, Solving the Problem of Prenatal Substance Abuse: An Analysis of
Punitive and Rehabilitative Approaches, 39 EMORY L. J. 1401, 1402 (1990) (citing a telephone
interview with Wayne F. Hooper, Unit Director of the Substance Abuse Unit, Northwest
Georgia Regional Hopsital, Rome, Georgia (March 22, 1990)).
14

Lichtenberg, supra note 12, at 380, citing Chasnoff et al., Temporal Patterns of Cocaine
Use in Pregnancy, 261 J. AM MED. A. 1741, 1744 (1989) (hereinafter Temporal Patterns).
15

Terres, supra note 11, at 65 referring to Chasnoff, Drug Use in Pregnancy: Parameters
of Risk, 35 THE PEDIATRIC CLINICS OF NORTH AMERICA 1403, 1406 (Dec. 1988) (hereinafter
Parameters of Risk).
16

Terres, supra note 11, at 66 referring to Little, Snell, Klein & Gilstrap, Cocaine Abuse
During Pregnancy: Maternal & Fetal Implications 73 OBSTET. & GYNECOL. 157, 158 (1989).
17

Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1402.

18

Terres, supra note 11, at 66 citing D. Holmes, J. Reich & J. Paternak, THE
DEVELOPMENT OF INFANTS BORN AT RISK 1 (1989).
19

Id. at 67 (citing Parameters of Risk, supra note 15, at 1405).

20

Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1401.

21

Henrick Harwood et al., The Economic Costs of Alcohol and Drug Abuse in the United
States, 1992 Health Care Costs, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF DRUG ABUSE, available at
http://www.nida.nih.gov/economiccosts/chapter4.html.
22

Terres, supra note 11, at 68. There is some indication that gestational drug use may
have long-term effects on child development.
23
See, e.g., Sarah Letitia Kowalski, Looking for a Solution: Determining Fetal Status for
Prenatal Drug Abuse Prosecutions, 38 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1255, 1258 (1998) (describing
arguments supporting government intervention).
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from obtaining prenatal medical care and treatment.24 The critics argue that pregnant
women will not seek medical care because they fear detection by physicians who are
operating as agents of the state.25 Nevertheless, some legislators and prosecutors still
believe that actions to curb prenatal drug abuse serve community interests. In
support of their position, they point to the extraordinary amount that the government
pays for medical care for drug-dependent newborns. Apparently, public sentiment
supports some form of government intervention, in particular criminalization.26
To address the problem of prenatal drug use, the state might use various tools
including prosecution, dependency proceedings, or civil commitment.27 Prosecutors
in the United States have already resorted to criminal prosecutions under existing
laws.28 They have also presented myriad proposals to address the problem, including
the adoption of new criminal statutes.
Regardless of the specific approach used, the government can rely on two sources
of authority in taking action to curb prenatal drug use. First the government can use
the doctrine of parens patriae. Second, state governments might exercise the police
power preserved for the states under the United States Constitution.
Parens patriae is an ancient doctrine that provides states with limited
paternalistic power to protect individuals who lack capacity to act in their own
interest. For example, parens patriae authority gives the state the power to enact
child abuse laws, to transfer custody of a child from a parent to the state, to order
treatment for a viable fetus in utero, and to compel a woman to submit to a caesarian
section. In Prince v. Massachusetts the United States Supreme Court recognized that
the state’s parens patriae authority empowers the state to regulate the family in the
public interest.29 In noting that the state may guard the general interest in the youth’s
well being, the United States Supreme Court explained that the state has a wide
range of power for limiting parental freedom and authority in situations affecting the
child’s welfare.30

24

See e.g. Kristen Burgess, Protective Custody, Will It Eradicate Fetal Abuse and Lead to
the Perfect Womb? 35 HOUSTON L. REV. 227, 272 (1998) (warning that women will distrust
their doctors and stop seeking treatment altogether).
25

Michelle Oberman, Mothers and Doctor’s Orders: Unmasking the Doctors’ Fiduciary
Role in Maternal-Fetal Conflicts, 94 NW U. L: Rev. 451, 484 (2000). One scholar maintains
that physicians violate their fiduciary duty to their pregnant patients when the physicians forge
“an alliance with criminal justice authorities in order to detect and punish patients who use
drugs.”
26
See Mark Curriden, Holding Mom Accountable, 76 A.B.A.J. 50, 51 (Mar., 1990)
(reporting survey results revealing that 71% of the 1500 people polled supported criminal
penalties for pregnant women whose illegal drug use injures their babies).
27

Lichtenberg, supra note 12, at 384.

28

Suzanne D’Amico, Inherently Female Cases of Child Abuse and Neglect: A GenderNeutral Analysis, 28 FORDHAM URBAN L. J. 855, 861 (2001). For example, a Florida
prosecutor brought a case for delivery of drugs to a minor, asserting that the umbilical cord
was used to pass drugs to the child during the seconds immediately after birth.
29

321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944).

30

Id. at 166-67.
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In addition to parens patriae, states utilize their police power to promote the
public welfare and to prevent citizens from harming one another.31 Speaking of the
evils that impede the “healthy, well rounded growth of young people” the United
States Supreme Court in Prince stated that legislation appropriately designed to
reach such evils is within the state’s police power.32 The state has this authority
notwithstanding the parents’ claim to control the child.33
C. Prosecutions under Existing Criminal Law
Prosecutors have attacked maternal substance abuse using different approaches.
Between 1985 and 1998 at least 240 women in the United States have been
prosecuted for using illegal drugs while pregnant.34 Generally prosecutors brought
cases under existing child abuse and child endangerment laws.35 Many cases were
eventually dismissed because the courts have been “unwilling to stretch criminal
child endangerment and child support statutes beyond their most obvious purposes–
to protect only already born children . . .”36 The Supreme Courts of Kentucky,
Nevada and Ohio have held that a mother cannot be convicted of child abuse or child
endangerment for using drugs while pregnant.37 In contrast to these decisions, the
Supreme Court of South Carolina held that South Carolina’s child abuse statute
protects a viable fetus as a child.38 In reaching this conclusion, the court interpreted
the term “child” to include a viable fetus.39 Furthermore, the court concluded that its
interpretation of the word “person” to include a fetus was consistent with the
legislature’s intended purpose in enacting the child abuse statute.40 The two women
who were convicted challenged the court’s interpretation seeking review by the
United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court refused to hear the case.41
31
Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1156,
1198-99 (1980) (discussing the use of state police power).
32

321 U.S. at 168-69.

33

Id. at 169.

34

Nancy Kubasek & Melissa Hinds, The Communitarian Case Against Prosecutions for
Prenatal Drug Abuse, 22 WOMAN’S RTS. L. REP. 1, 2 (2000).
35

Kristen Barrett, Note, Prosecuting Pregnant Addicts for Dealing to the Unborn, 33 ARIZ.
L. REV. 221, 229 (1991).
36

Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1404. For a discussion of two California cases where the
judges declined to apply the criminal statutes to unborn children, see Wilkins supra note 13, at
1411-15. One case was brought under the penal code section making it a misdemeanor for a
parent to fail to provide necessary support for minor children and the other indictment was
brought under the penal code section relating to endangering a child.
37

Tara-Nicholle B. DeLouth, Pregnant Drug Addicts as Child Abusers: A South Carolina
Ruling, 14 BERKELEY WOMEN’S L. J. 96 (1999).
38

Whitner v. State, 492 S.E. 2d 777, 778 (S.C. 1997), reh’g denied, cert. denied, 523 U.S.
1145 (1998).
39

Id. at 778.

40

Id. at 780-81.

41

523 U.S. 1145 (1998).
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Other prosecutions have based cases on laws prohibiting the possession of drugs
and the delivery of drugs to minors.42 One conviction that received national attention
was the case of Jennifer Johnson, who was convicted of violating the Florida statute
prohibiting delivery of drugs to minors.43 Such convictions based on existing laws
have been challenged on a number of grounds. In allowing these prosecutions,
courts are applying to fetuses the state laws intended to protect children. In the
absence of clear legislative intent, this amounts to an improper extension of the law.
These prosecutions appear to violate the due process requirements of notice and fair
warning because they require a novel construction of the law. Arguably, the mothers
did not have the requisite notice that their drug use would later be treated as a
violation of the drug distribution statutes that are intended to apply to the sale of
illegal drugs, not the mere use of illegal drugs.44 Furthermore, opponents of
prosecutions have also asserted equal protection arguments because pregnant women
are singled out for prosecution.45
D. New Legislation
The enactment of specific legislation criminalizing certain maternal behavior
during pregnancy and imposing liability for the harmful effects of maternal drug use
should satisfy the due process requirements that the legislature, rather than the
courts, define criminal offenses.46 Some states have reacted to the unsuccessful
prosecutions by adopting legislation that directly addresses prenatal alcohol and drug
abuse. For example, Minnesota has passed a comprehensive law requiring that
physicians administer toxicology tests and report suspected addicts to child welfare
agencies.47 The child welfare agency can then seek civil commitment of a pregnant
woman who is using illegal drugs if she refuses or fails recommended voluntary
treatment.48 Although this legislation is not criminal in nature, some authors still
maintain that addicts will shun all treatment, rather than be subject to commitment.49
42

Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1409 (noting that prosecutions in Georgia, Florida, Michigan,
Massachusetts, and South Carolina have relied on laws prohibiting the possession of drugs and
the delivery of drugs to minors).
43
State v. Johnson, No. E89-890-CFA (18th Jud. Cir. Seminole County, Fla., July 13,
1989). In this slip opinion the trial judge stated, “I am convinced and find that the term
‘deliver’ includes the passage of cocaine or a derivative of it from the body of the mother into
the body of her child through an umbilical cord after birth occurs.” See Wilkins, supra note
13, at 1410-11 for criticism of the court’s construction of the applicable Florida statute.
44

Kary Moss, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy, 13 HARV. WOMEN’S L. J. 278, 286
(1990).
45
Id. at 286. See also Jeffrey A. Parness, Prospective Fathers and Their Unborn Children,
13 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. J. 165 (1991) (urging that pre-birth paternal duties be considered
as pre-birth maternal duties are considered).
46

Doretta M. McGinnis, Prosecution of Mothers of Drug-exposed Babies: Constitutional
and Criminal Theory, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 505, 513 (1990).
47
For a discussion of the features of the Minnesota law, see Judith M. Nyhus Johnson,
Minnesota’s “Crack Baby Law”: Weapon of War or Link in a Chain? 8 LAW & IN EQ. 485,
491 (1990).
48
See Carol Gosain, Protective Custody for Fetuses: A Solution to the Problem of
Maternal Drug Use? Casenote on Wisconsin ex rel Angela v. Druziki, 5 GEORGE MASON L.
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A few states including Illinois, Massachusetts, Nevada, Oklahoma, and Utah
have expanded the definition of “neglected minor” to include babies born with drugs
in their systems.50 For example, the Massachusetts statute treats prenatal abuse as a
criminal offense that medical providers must report once they determine that a child
is physically dependent on an addictive drug.51 Other states rejected legislation
including more draconian measures such as those requiring that some contraceptive
devise, such as Norplant, be implanted in first time drug offenders who fail to
complete a drug treatment program.52 While adoption of tightly drawn legislation
might satisfy procedural due process requirements such as notice and fair warning,
such legislation still poses other constitutional questions related to maternal interests
and state interests.53
III. BALANCING THE INTERESTS OF THE STATE AND THE
MOTHER–CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO NEW LEGISLATION
As noted above, various commentators maintain that government intervention
creates a conflict between a woman’s rights on one hand and the state interest and
“fetal rights” on the other hand. They maintain that any intervention impinges on
privacy rights recognized in Roe v. Wade.54 In invalidating the Texas criminal
statute that prohibited all elective abortions, the United States Supreme Court in Roe
explicitly refused to extend constitutional protection to fetuses. As stated by the
Court, the word “person” as used in the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution does not include the unborn.55 In reaching this conclusion, the Court
recognized that the privacy right regarding procreative decision-making protects a
woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy.56 Applying a strict scrutiny test, the court
identified two legitimate state interests that become compelling at different points
during the pregnancy.57

REV. 799, n. 316 (1997) (noting that the Minnesota statute has not faced a constitutional
challenge).
49

Wilkins, supra note 13, at 1429.

50

Id.

51

Kubasek & Hinds, supra note 34, at 6.

52

Id. at 7 (referring to legislation defeated in Ohio).

53

Some authors treat “fetal rights” as a separate category and approach the issues of
prenatal drug use in terms of “fetal rights” versus maternal rights. E.g., Tom Richoff,
Protecting the Fetus from Maternal Drug and Alcohol Abuse: A Proposal for Texas, 21 ST.
MARY’S L. J. 259, 286-87 (1989).
54

410 U.S. 113 (1973).

55

Id. at 158.

56

Id. at 153.

57

From the end of the first trimester until the point of viability, the state may regulate the
abortion procedure in ways that are reasonably related to the state interest in preserving and
protecting the health of the pregnant woman. From the point of viability until birth, a state
interest in protecting the “potentiality of human life” allows it to proscribe all abortions except
those necessary to preserve the life or health of the mother. Id. at 163-64.
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Subsequently, in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, the United States
Supreme Court reaffirmed the state interest in protecting potential life, denying that
the interest only came into existence at the point of viability.58 Later in Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, the Supreme Court went a step further in rejecting the trimester
approach first articulated in Roe.59
While reaffirming the “essential holding of Roe” related to a woman’s right to
terminate her pregnancy, the Casey court made the following observation:
Yet it must be remembered that Roe v. Wade speaks with clarity in
establishing not only the woman’s liberty but also the State’s “important
and legitimate interest in potential life.” That portion of the decision in
Roe has been given too little acknowledgement and implementation by the
court in its subsequent cases. (citations omitted)60
Although Roe, Webster, and Casey provide some framework in which to analyze
conflicts between maternal privacy rights and the state’s interests in protecting the
fetus, the state, and maternal interests implicated by fetal abuse legislation are
different from those in the abortion context. As stated in one commentary:
The maternal privacy right at issue in fetal abuse cases focuses not on a
woman’s decision whether to continue her pregnancy—the abortion
question—but rather on her decisions regarding how to conduct her life
during her pregnancy. In the fetal abuse context, the state’s interests are
not preservation of the mother’s health and the protection of potential life
against intentional termination, but the enhancement of the born child’s
quality of life through protection of the fetus from reckless or negligent
harm. Roe’s holding that the state’s interest in the birth of a fetus does not
become compelling during the first two trimesters of pregnancy does not
rule out the existence of a compelling state interest in ensuring that fetuses
that will be carried to term are born unharmed. States may have a greater
interest in preventing future suffering of those who will be born than in
ensuring that any particular fetus will be born.61
The basic argument is that the woman’s right to terminate her pregnancy does not
conflict with her responsibility for the life of her unborn child because the state has
an interest in protecting the quality of life that will be brought to term.62 As
explained by one bioethics expert, Professor John A. Robertson, once a woman
decides not to end her pregnancy she assumes certain obligations to refrain from
causing harm to the future child.63 Some authors challenge this position, arguing that
58

“The state’s interest, if compelling after viability, is equally compelling before viability.”
492 U.S. 490, 519 (1989).
59

505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992) (adopting an undue burden test).

60

Id. at 871.

61

Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization of
“Fetal Abuse,” 101 HARV. L. REV. 994, 997 (1988) (citations omitted).
62

Terres, supra note 11, at 71.

63

John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy and
Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 438 (1989) (arguing that a woman who chooses not to abort
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it creates the proverbial slippery slope and opens the floodgates to prosecute
pregnant women for any activity that might conceivably harm their fetuses.64 A
response to this criticism is that the floodgates will not be opened if the legislation is
targeted only at conduct that is already illegal.
One commentator who advocates government intervention to curb prenatal drug
use insists that parental rights can and should be expanded without the troubling
characterization of the unborn as “persons”.65 As stated, the unborn can be protected
like snaildarters or historic buildings.66
Some note that no one has a privacy right to take an illegal drug. At the same
time, the state has a strong interest in curbing drug use that is closely linked to fetal
distress.67 Therefore, the mother’s right to reproductive privacy and personal
autonomy should not shield her from government intervention.68
IV. ANALYSIS OF DUTIES AND CORRELATING RIGHTS
A. Maternal Obligations and Duties
The debate discussed above largely turns on different views on what obligations,
if any, a woman assumes after she has decided not to terminate a pregnancy. Does a
pregnant woman owe any moral or common law duty to the fetus to refrain from

has a legal and moral duty to bring the child into the world as healthy as is reasonably
possible). See also Molly McNulty, Pregnancy Police: The Health Policy and Legal
Implications of Punishing Pregnant Women for Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. &
SOC. CHANGE 277, 292 (1987-88) (asserting that a woman waives her right to autonomy and
assumes a duty of self-care after she decides not to abort); Barbara Shelley, Maternal
Substance Abuse: The Next Step in the Protection of Fetal Rights? 92 DICK. L. REV. 691, 71314 (1988) (noting that the critical point of state intervention is when the woman chooses to
carry the fetus for the full term and not exercise her right to abort).
64

McGinnis, supra note 46, at 518.

65

See Jeffrey A. Parness, The Legal Status of the Unborn After Webster, 95 DICK L. REV.
1, 21 (1990).
66

Id.

67

E.g., Note, supra note 61, at 1007-08.

68

Obviously, the analysis of proposed legislation would be significantly different if the
government undertook to regulate some conduct that would otherwise be legal if the woman
was not pregnant. This is one of the obstacles the government must overcome if it seeks to
control alcohol consumption by pregnant women. Government intervention in the case of
gestational alcohol abuse is more complicated than intervention in the case of illegal drug use
because it is normally legal for a person to imbibe alcohol. Despite the fact that the
consumption of alcohol is generally legal, the government could take steps to control the
gestational alcohol abuse. Any legislation criminalizing gestational drug use could be
compared to criminal legislation related to driving while intoxicated (DWI). With DWI
legislation the state converts legal drinking into illegal conduct due to the fact that the conduct
occurs while a person is driving a vehicle. Clearly, the difficulty in adopting similar
legislation targeting gestational alcohol use is identifying and monitoring levels of
consumption.
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using illegal drugs? Although members of society may recognize a moral obligation
of a mother to her fetus, it does not follow that there is a legal obligation.69
The inextricable link between the pregnant woman and the fetus militates toward
recognizing at least a moral duty to protect fetal health. New scientific evidence and
technical developments have produced a wealth of information revealing how a
pregnant woman’s actions and omissions affect the fetus.70 The difficulty in
determining the extent of a woman’s moral duty relates to the fact that practically
everything a pregnant woman does conceivably affects the fetus. Should pregnant
women be treated as “fetal containers” or saints whose conduct is governed by a
standard based on the best interest of the fetus?71 Does a woman fail to meet her
obligations to the fetus when she does not take enough vitamins or takes over the
counter drug? Does a woman meet her duty to the fetus if she fails to take some
action that would improve fetal health, but avoids conduct that causes harm, such as
smoking tobacco, drinking alcohol or using illegal drugs?72 These questions
illustrate the difficulty in defining the scope of a pregnant woman’s moral duty to
protect fetal health. Various authors have criticized perspectives and approaches that
view women as if they are “fetal containers” subject to control by pregnancy police.73
To some the most troublesome issue involves reconciling such a moral duty to
the fetus with a pregnant woman’s right to terminate the pregnancy. Those who
oppose abortion might simply dismiss the question by saying that no reconciliation is
necessary or possible. In their opinion, any termination of a pregnancy would be an
immoral violation of a woman’s duty to the fetus.
Another approach is to re-conceptualize the maternal duty as a duty to the unborn
child, rather than to the fetus. Using this approach, a woman still can exercise her
legal right to terminate a pregnancy. On the other hand, if she chooses not to
terminate the pregnancy she owes a duty to the future child who has not yet been
born. Basically, by electing not to terminate she assumes a moral duty to the unborn
child to refrain from causing harm to the future child. In discussing the distinction
between a duty to the fetus and the duty to an unborn child, one author suggested that
this duty of care to refrain from doing harm to the unborn child is the same as the
duty owed to any stranger.74 A pregnant woman may end her duty by having an
69
See Patricia A. King, Should Mom Be Constrained in the Best Interests of the Fetus? 13
NOVA L. REV. 393, 399 (1989) (noting that courts may convert moral obligations into legal
ones in an effort to coerce “the least willing members of the community to conform to moral
norms”).
70

See id. at 396 (identifying an extensive list of maternal behaviors that affect a fetus).

71

See id. at 397 (suggesting that requiring that a pregnant woman do everything in the best
interest of the fetus effectively requires that she act as a “saint”).
72

In distinguishing conduct that could properly be regulated Professor King notes that
requiring that “harm or evil not be inflicted is different from requiring that harm or evil be
removed.” Id. at 397. “The proposition that we have a greater obligation to refrain from
causing harm than to promote good finds support in common notions of morality as well as
law.” Id. at 397-98.
73
The term “fetal containers” appeared in the early scholarship of George J. Annas,
Pregnant Women as Fetal Containers, 16 HASTINGS CTR. REP 13 (Dec. 1986).
74

Deborah Mathieu, Respecting Liberty and Preventing Harm: Limits on State
Intervention in Prenatal Choice, 8 HARV. J. L. PUB. POLICY 19, 37 (1985).
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abortion.75 If, on other hand, she chooses not to have an abortion, “she places herself
in a special relationship with her future child, a relationship that carries certain
inherent obligations similar to those of any parent toward his or her child.”76
Using this approach, one would have to determine the scope of parental obligations
to a child. Does a parent have a moral obligation to submit to a bone marrow
transplant in order to save the life of her child? Does a pregnant woman have a
moral obligation to submit to fetal surgery in order to protect the health of the fetus?
These questions illustrate the difficulty in defining the scope of a pregnant woman’s
moral obligation to the fetus.
Despite this lack of clarity on the scope of the pregnant woman’s moral
obligation, some advocates of “fetal rights” still insist that the moral obligation to
protect fetal health should be recognized as a legal obligation. In support of this
position, these advocates point to the dictum in Roe where the Court said that a
“woman can not be left alone in her privacy.”77 In the context of the Court’s
opinion, this dictum is not very helpful in determining if a mother owes a legal duty
to her fetus. Therefore, “Roe’s effect on the judicial refinement of the legal duty a
mother owes her unborn child remains unclear.”78
The Roe opinion has split on the question of the existence of a legal duty owed
by a pregnant woman to protect fetal health.79 In Grodin v. Grodin, the Michigan
Court of Appeals found a woman liable to her child for taking tetracycline while
pregnant.80 In its opinion the Michigan appellate court indicated that a mother
should bear the same liability as a third person would bear for negligent infliction of
prenatal injury.81 Similarly, in Smith v. Brennan the Supreme Court of New Jersey
recognized a child’s cause of action for negligent prenatal injury, stating that a “child
has a legal right to begin life with sound mind and body.”82
Other courts have reached different conclusions on the existence of a mother’s
legal duty to the fetus. In 1999, a Texas appellate court considered a child’s claims
against the mother for injuries resulting from the mother’s illegal drug use. In a case
of first impression, the Texas appellate court held that Texas state law does not
recognize a cause of action in tort for injuries caused by the mother’s negligent or
grossly negligent conduct.83 Similarly, in Stallman v. Youngquist,84 the Supreme

75

Id.

76

Id.

77

410 U.S. at 159.

78

David E. Koropp, Setting the Standard: A Mother’s Duty During the Prenatal Period,
189 U. ILL. L. REV. 493, 505 (1989).
79
Susan R. Weinberg, A Maternal Duty to Protect Fetal Health, 58 IND. L.J. 531, 535
(1982-83).
80

301 N.W. 2d 869, 870 (Mich. Appeals 1980).

81

Id. The appellate court remanded the case to the trial court for a determination on the
“reasonableness” of the negligent conduct. Id. at 871.
82

157 A.2d 497, 503 (N.J. 1960).

83

Chenault v. Huie, 989 S.W. 2d 474 (Tex. Appeals—Dallas, 1999) (no pet. history). The
appointed conservator for the child brought suit against the mother.
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Court of Illinois refused to recognize that the mother had a common law duty to the
fetus.85 Although the Stallman court recognized the important state interest in fetal
well being, it deferred to the legislature as the more appropriate forum.86 This
appears to be an invitation for legislative action to promote fetal health under the
auspices of state interests.
States can adopt different types of legislation targeted at curbing prenatal drug
use. For example, state legislatures could require that pregnant drug addicts obtain
treatment and refrain from the use of illegal drugs. As noted above, opponents of
this type of legislation fear that the creation of such a duty would interfere with the
privacy and autonomy interests of the pregnant women by recognizing “fetal
rights.”87 The following discussion of rights and correlating duties suggests that the
states can adopt legislation dealing with prenatal drug use without recognizing “fetal
rights.”
B. Analysis and Critique of Hohfeld’s Correlatives
Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld analyzed the legal conceptions of rights and duties in
his work, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning.88
Hohfeld systematically discussed legal conceptions such as rights, duties and
privileges rhetorically and as a system of mutually self-defining relations.89
Hohfeld began his discussion of jural relations by noting that strictly fundamental
legal relations are sui generis and “[that] attempts at formal definition [prove to be]
unsatisfactory.”90 Therefore, Hohfeld believed that the most promising line of
procedure was to consider the “relations” in a scheme of opposites and correlates.91
In his system of classification, Hohfeld identified eight legal conceptions: four
primary legal entitlements (rights, privileges, powers and immunities) and their
opposites (no-rights, duties, disabilities and liabilities).92 “Rights are claims
84

531 N.E. 355 (Illinois 1988).

85

Id.

86

Id. at 361.
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See King, supra note 69 at 399 for a general discussion of privacy and equity concerns in
recognizing a legal duty of a woman to her fetus.
88

Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions As Applied in
Judicial Reasoning, 23 YALE L. J. 16 (1913). A continuation of the article appeared later in
Wesley N. Hohfeld, Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 26
YALE L. J. 710 (1917). The references in this paper will refer to the article appearing in 23
YALE L. J. 16 (1913). Since Hohfeld’s publication of this analysis, his system has been
debated. Those who have adopted the Hohfeldian scheme include conservative scholars on
one end of the spectrum and critical legal scholars on the other end. See Calvin R. Massey,
Law’s Inferno, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 1269, 1273, n. 11 (1988) (reviewing MARK KELMAN, A
GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES) (1987).
89

J. M. Balkin, The Hohfeldian Approach to Law and Semiotics, 44 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1119, 1120 (1990).
90

Hohfeld, supra note 88, at 45.
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Id. at 30.
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Id.
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enforceable by state power that others act in a certain manner in relation to the
rightholder.”93 A privilege is a negation of a legal duty, as in the privilege against
self-incrimination in the face of a duty.94 “Powers are state-enforced abilities to
change legal entitlement held by oneself or others.” An example of a power is when
a property owner has the legal power to transfer the property.95 “An immunity is
security from having one’s own entitlement changed by others,” which amounts to a
freedom from legal liability.96
In connection with the four primary entitlements, Hohfeld sets forth negations or
opposites of the entitlements. These connections or references are the essence of
Hohfeld’s theory. According to Hohfeld, “a legal meaning cannot be ascertained
without reference to its partner, either opposite or correlative, and the relationships
embodied therein.”97
Using this approach, the negations or opposites of a primary entitlement refer to
the absence of entitlement. The opposite of a right is what Hohfeld deemed to be
“no right.” Under Hohfeld’s scheme, a person has “no right” if he or she has no
claim enforceable by state power. With this concept of opposites, a person has either
one or the other of the opposites. This is different from Hohfeldian analysis of
correlatives, which describes dynamic legal relations between two parties. If the
state recognizes a right and confers an advantage on some party, it simultaneously
creates vulnerability on the part of others.98 This vulnerability or disadvantage is the
legal correlative that is a matching interest held by at least one other person. A
claim-right correlates with a legal duty. For example, a lessor has a right to receive
rental payments and the lessee has a duty to make rental payments. Basically,
Hohfeld believed “that rights and duties are best analyzed, not as moral absolutes
owed or demanded from the whole world, but rather as different aspects of a bilateral
relationship between parties.”99
Some scholars have challenged this bilateral feature of the Hohfeldian system.
They note that legal relationships are in fact triadic in nature, with the sovereign and
the courts as the third element in the triad.100 Jural relations are triadic even when the
93
Joseph William SinGer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from
Bentham to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV. 975, 986 (1982) (analyzing Hohfeld’s fundamental
legal conceptions).
94

Id. at 40.

95

Id. at 45.
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Id. at 55.
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H. Newcomb Morse, Applying the Hohfeld System to Constitutional Analysis, 9
WHITTIER L. REV. 639, note l (1988).
98

Joseph W. Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from Bentham
to Hohfeld, 1982 WIS. L. REV 975, 987 (1982).
99
Patrick Dooley, The Unreasonableness of Requiring a Warrant for Searches of NonResident Aliens in a Foreign Country: United States v. Verdugo-urquidez, 20 CAL. W. INT’L.
L.J. 355, note 48 (1989/90).
100
Perry Dane, Vested Rights, “Vestedness,” and Choice of Law, 96 YALE L. J. 1191, 1254
n. 217 (1990) (noting that the formulation of the objection to the Hohfeld primary terms is
based very loosely on R. Dworkin’s discussion of choice of law in TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1978)).
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government confronts an individual. For example, in the collection of taxes, “the
government” must be divided into those officials who claim a tax and those who
decide a dispute and impose sanctions.101
Other critics question whether the duties imposed by the criminal law or other
areas of public law necessarily correlate with rights of individuals to claim
performance of those duties. In fact some philosophers, including Jeremy Bentham
and John Austin, took the view that there are some legal duties for which there were
no correlative rights.102
In his LECTURES ON JURISPRUDENCE, Austin described some obligations
as absolute duties, which exist independently of any correlative right. He described
absolute duties as those prescribing actions toward parties other than the one obliged,
who are not determinate persons, such as members generally of an independent
society and mankind at large.103 As indicated by the following passage, Hans Kelsen
also believed that there were legal obligations that were not always connected to
legal rights of individuals:
If the obligated behavior of one individual does not refer to a specifically
designated other individual (that is, if it does not have to take place with
respect to a specifically determined individual) but refers only to the legal
community as such, then--although one sometimes speaks of a “right of
the community” (especially of the state) to the behavior of the obligated
individual, such as the obligation to do military service—one is satisfied
in other cases to assume a legal obligation without a corresponding reflex
right: for example in the case of legal norms that prescribe a certain
human behavior toward some animals, plants, or inanimate objects by
pain or punishment. . . These are obligations that—indirectly—exist
toward the legal community interested in these objects.104
The Hohfeldian response to this position would be that any judicial question still
concerns two parties. In the case of a criminal statute, some person acting on behalf
of the government seeks enforcement of a legal duty. The representative of the
government is viewed as a person who on behalf of the government has a right to
require that another person fulfill a duty. Stated differently, a claim-right asserted
against the state or a claim asserted by the state is always a claim asserted by some
living flesh and blood person that is empowered in some way and recognized by
courts.105
Joel Feinberg takes a different approach arguing that some claim-rights do not
have correlative duties. In his essays entitled “Duties, Rights and Claims,” and “The
Nature and Value of Rights,” he examines the extent to which duties and Hohfeld’s
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See JEROME HALL, FOUNDATIONS OF JURISPRUDENCE 166 (1973).
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J.W. HARRIS, LEGAL PHILOSOPHIES 81 (1980).
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Dane, supra note 100, at 1254, n. 217 (noting that the objection to the Hohfeld primary
terms is based very loosely on R. Dworkin’s discussion of choice of law in TAKING RIGHTS
SERIOUSLY (1978)).
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HANS KELSEN, PURE THEORY OF LAW 128 (M. Knights trans. 1967).
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Max Radin, A Restatement of Hohfeld, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1141, 1162 (1938).
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“claim-rights” are logically correlative.106 Feinberg identifies classes of normative
relations called “duties.” These “duties include duties of indebtedness, commitment,
reparation, need-fulfillment, reciprocation, respect, community membership, status
and obedience.” Feinberg distinguishes the classes of duties and describes why some
of the duties are necessarily correlated with other people’s rights while others are
not.107
Under Feinberg’s scheme, duties imposed by law are characterized as “duties of
obedience.” In discussing the example of a police officer who demands a motorist
stop, Feinberg questions whether the police officer has a personal right to demand
that the motorist stop.108 Rather, it appears that the officer has an official right
derived from the police officer’s status. Noting that some duties of obedience are
“owed” to impersonal authority like “the law,” Feinberg concludes that some duties
of obedience do not seem to entail correlative rights.109
In dialogues on duties and correlating rights, one example that is frequently used
is the “duty” to give to charity. Although one may have such a duty to make
charitable contributions, it does not follow that the potential donee has a right to
demand the charitable contribution. For example, both the American Bar
Association Model Code of Professional Responsibility (“Model Code”)110 and the
American Bar Association Model Rules of Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”)111
include aspirational provisions urging attorneys to provide pro bono legal services as
part of attorneys’ professional obligations.112 This pro bono obligation or duty of
attorneys has been recognized by all states that have adopted some version of the
Model Code or Model Rules. Despite the provisions in legal ethics codes, indigent
persons would face difficulty in establishing a right that requires attorneys to meet
this professional duty.113

106
JOEL FEINBERG, RIGHTS, JUSTICE AND THE BOUNDS OF LIBERTY—ESSAYS IN SOCIAL
JUSTICE 130-155 (1980). In the preface, Feinberg noted that his discussion was limited to
what Hohfeld called “claim-rights.”
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See id. at 130-39.
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See id. at 138.
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Id.
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The MODEL CODE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY EC 2-25 (1981) states: “Every
lawyer, regardless of professional prominence or professional workload, should find time to
participate in serving the disadvantaged. The rendition of free legal services to those unable to
pay reasonable fees continues to be an obligation of each lawyer.”
111

MODEL RULES OF PROF’S CONDUCT Rule 6.1 (1983) states, in pertinent part, that
a lawyer should aspire to render at least 50 hours of pro bono publico legal services per year.
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The revised Model Rules approved by the ABA House of Delegates in 2002 expressly
state that every lawyer has a “professional responsibility to provide legal services to those
unable to pay.” MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 6.1 (2002).
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In Texas, farm workers filed a class action against the State Bar of Texas. The plaintiffs
sought a court order requiring the State Bar to enforce a mandatory pro bono program.
Among other things, the plaintiffs have based their action on the provision in the Texas
Disciplinary Rules of Professional Conduct stating that lawyers should render public interest
legal service. The matter was placed on the administrative docket of the Supreme Court of
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Whether a person agrees with Feinberg and other writers who maintain that
certain duties do not create corresponding rights, or if a person takes a Hohfeldian
approach, it is not necessary to recognize “fetal rights” in enacting statutes related to
prenatal drug use. Under Hohfeld’s scheme, the representative of the government
has a right to require compliance with statutes and the pregnant woman has the
corresponding duty to comply. Using Hohfeldian analysis, the imposition of a duty
by the government on a pregnant woman would not create corresponding “fetal
rights” because the fetus would not be part of the legal relationship. Rather, it is a
matter between the state (or a representative of the state) and the pregnant woman.
The duty imposed by the state is a duty owed to the state or the community. It is not
a duty owed to the fetus.
Even scholars who do not subscribe to Hohfeld’s doctrine of logical correlatives
should reach a similar conclusion. Using their analysis, the government unilaterally
would impose a legal duty on the pregnant woman. Once again, it is a matter
between the state and the pregnant woman.
This analysis of duty and correlating rights can be used to address the concerns of
women’s rights advocates who fear that any government regulation of prenatal drug
use will inevitably affect a woman’s privacy rights. Many women’s rights advocates
are genuinely concerned that any intervention will amount to a recognition of “fetal
rights,” and ultimately affect a woman’s right to choose to terminate a pregnancy.
These concerns might be allayed if the women’s rights advocates understand that the
government can impose a legal duty which is owed to the state, without any
recognition of “fetal rights.”
V. THE UTILITY AND SHORTCOMINGS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS
Having determined that the legislation targeting prenatal drug use does not
require the recognition of fetal rights, the next step is to evaluate the advisability of
adopting criminal legislation that punishes women for not getting drug treatment. As
an analytical framework, the evaluation can use utilitarian theory of justice in
assessing the interests served in adopting legislation criminalizing prenatal drug use.
The basic tenet of utilitarianism is “the greatest good for the greatest number.”
The criterion of the rightness of actions refers to the consequences.114 The morality
of any kind of act will then depend on whether or not it will promote consequences
more favorable than those produced by some alternative.115 Different versions of
utilitarianism take different approaches in evaluating the consequences.
In assessing the utility of legislation relating to the maternal-fetal relationship,
lawmakers should weigh the proposed benefit with the costs to the individual
woman, the fetus, and society.116 Undoubtedly, the state has a legitimate public
health concern in facilitating the treatment of pregnant women. This treatment
serves that interest, as well as the general welfare of the individual woman and the
fetus.
Texas. Janet Elliott, Texas Has A Long Way To Go On Pro Bono Problem, TEXAS LAWYER,
Jan. 31, 2000, at 4.
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In the case of maternal conduct, a justification for a criminal law related to the
prevention of prenatal drug use would be found in the value asserted by society in
condemning harmful behavior and in attempting to prevent the behavior.117
Although this may be a desirable goal, the question remains as to whether a criminal
statute would actually deter harmful behavior. Due to the nature of drug addiction,
numerous commentators doubt that the adoption of legislation criminalizing prenatal
drug use will significantly deter women from using illegal drugs.118 In support of
their argument, they note that drug users apparently are not deterred by the existing
criminal laws relating to illicit drugs.119
Moreover, the critics maintain that the negative consequences of criminalization
must be considered in weighing the costs of the legislation. Specifically, they
express concern that legislation criminalizing prenatal drug use will only deter
women from seeking prenatal care. The same objection has been expressed with
respect to statutes that empower the government to civilly commit women for
mandatory treatment.120 If pregnant women fear being “turned in” by their doctors,
they may not get the health-related services that they desperately need. Obviously,
the failure of women to obtain adequate care will result in more fetal and maternal
problems.
The American Medical Association (AMA), the largest medical society in the
United States, expressed these concerns in its Amicus Curiae Brief filed in the
United States Supreme Court in Ferguson v. City of Charleston. In asserting that
criminal sanctions are ineffective in halting drug use by pregnant women, the AMA
argued that criminal sanctions actually increase the risk of harm by discouraging
prenatal and postnatal care and undermining the physician/patient relationship.121 In
its brief the AMA emphasized that drug addiction is a disease that cannot be
overcome by self-discipline.122 As explained, “one of the fundamental characteristics
of drug dependency is the inability to reduce or control substance abuse, despite the
possibility of adverse consequences.”123 According to the AMA, only “consensual
treatment” can overcome the illness of drug addiction.124 Therefore, the AMA
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See e.g. Antoinette Clarke, Fins, Pins, Chips & Chins: A Reasoned Approach to the
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maintains that “criminal sanctions are unlikely to achieve the goal of deterring drug
use among pregnant women.”125
Other medical groups share this view in opposing criminal prosecutions of
pregnant women. The sentiments of health care providers are summarized in the
following statement made by various medical groups in connection with the
prosecution of one California mother:
Such prosecution is counterproductive to the public interest as it may
discourage a woman from seeking prenatal care or dissuade her from
providing accurate information to health care providers out of fear of selfincrimination. This failure to seek proper care or to withhold vital
information concerning her health could increase the risk to herself and
her baby.126
Clearly, this is a very serious concern given that the principle objective of
intervention should be to curb prenatal drug use and to promote health of the mother
and unborn child. If criminal legislation actually deters women from obtaining
treatment, the only purpose criminalization serves is to punish socially undesirable
conduct.127 The proposal discussed below is intended to address this concern.
VI. PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATION THAT TREATS DRUG ADDICTION AS A DISEASE
As noted in the introduction, the majority of the articles written on prenatal drug
abuse tend to fall into one of two camps: (l) those advocating government action; and
(2) those advocating a woman’s right of privacy and autonomy. Authors in both
camps see a conflict between women’s rights and “fetal rights.” This conflict is
more like a battle where one party wins and the other loses. In focusing on
treatment, the following proposal intended to create a “win/win” situation where the
interests of the mother, the unborn child and the society are served.
The proposal is based on opinions of medical and addiction experts who urge
treating drug abuse as a disease.128 The United States Supreme Court has recognized
Understanding Drug Abuse and Addiction: What Science Says, National Institute on Drug
Abuse, http://www.drugabuse.gov/Teaching3/teachings5.html.
125
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of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, contained in the Defendant’s
Motion to Dismiss in People v. Stewart (Cal. Mun. Ct. Feb. 23, 1987).
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The respondents in Ferguson v. City of Charleston challenged the assertion that the
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As noted by the respondents, hospital data “did not demonstrate any change in utilization
patterns of their prenatal clinics nor did they identify any increase in unbooked deliveries at
other regional hospitals.” Brief of Respondents, at 10, Ferguson v. City of Charleston., 2000
WL 1341474, (No. 99-936).
128
David C. Brody & Heidee McMillin, Combating Fetal Substance Abuse and
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Common Sense: Helping Women Help Themselves, 12 HASTING WOMEN’S L.J 243, 244-245
(2001) (urging a multidimensional collaborative effort to dealing with maternal substance
abuse).
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drug addiction as an illness requiring treatment.129 As stated by the Court, persons
addicted to narcotics “are diseased and proper subject for [medical] treatment.”130
The proposed legislation provides meaningful assistance to addicted women,
including services that may help prevent addicted women from getting pregnant.
The proposed public health legislation incorporates four major components:
education, testing, addiction intervention, and effective treatment. Taken together
these features operate as a comprehensive government program.
The first portion of the program focuses on prevention by educating women on
the dangers of prenatal drug use, as well as the importance and availability of
treatment. This education should start with mandatory programs in secondary
schools. Government sponsored public service announcements on television and
radio can reach the general population. Finally, public health agencies can produce
and distribute brochures to be made available in medical clinics and offices of
physicians who provide primary medical care. All publicity and educational
materials should communicate the humanistic message that the community cares
about the pregnant drug user and that she should care enough to get treatment. This
message will also help foster the sense of duty if the pregnant woman decides to
have a child.
Serious problems associated with prenatal drug use early in a pregnancy can be
avoided if women get drug treatment before they know they are pregnant or take
precautions not to become pregnant. This early intervention is very important
because research has revealed that the most damage to a fetus occurs early in the
pregnancy.131
The second feature of the government program is public health legislation
providing for drug testing of pregnant women. All physicians treating pregnant
women would be required to administer a test for specified drugs, unless the
pregnant woman objects. In two respects this approach to testing differs from the
Charleston testing program that the United States Supreme Court declared to be
unconstitutional in Ferguson v. City of Charleston.132 First, the testing proposed here
effectively requires that women provide their informed consent before being tested.
Second, the proposed testing would be conducted purely for medical purposes. By
law the results of the tests would be confidential and unavailable to law enforcement
authorities. Women would be advised that the testing would be confidential, but not
anonymous.133 They would be told in writing that a positive drug test would be

129
Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that a state law that
imprisons a drug addict as a criminal inflicts cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
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reported to a specified public health agency that arranges for formal drug counseling
with the woman.134
In his concurring opinion in Ferguson, Justice Kennedy appeared to endorse the
validity of mandatory testing conducted for medical purposes. Justice Kennedy
referred to “reputable sources” in making the following observation:
[W]e must accept the premise that the medical profession can adopt
acceptable criteria for testing expectant mothers for cocaine use in order
to provide prompt and effective counseling to the mother and to take
proper medical steps to protect the child.135
This approach to mandatory testing of all pregnant women who do not object
addresses various problems associated with discretionary testing. First, it eliminates
possible discrimination that results when physicians exercise discretion.136 Second, it
forces all physicians to deal with the drug issue with all women. Even though
women have the right to refuse testing, they all benefit from receiving information
on drug addiction, the effect of drugs on the fetus, and available treatment.
Trained drug counselors will contact those women who do consent to testing if
their tests are positive or they indicate a desire for further counseling. The
counselors conduct formal drug addiction interventions such as those commonly
done to encourage addicted persons to get treatment for their disease. The
counselors would also provide information on available social services that will
improve the likelihood that treatment would be obtained and effective. At the time
of the intervention, the counselor must evaluate the financial condition of the
pregnant woman. If the counselor determines that the pregnant woman does not
have the means to finance drug treatment, the counselor will certify that the woman
qualifies for the government to pay the reasonable costs of drug treatment.
This leads to the most important feature of the program--government funding and
support of treatment programs. After testing and intervention, comprehensive
treatment must be made available. For effective treatment, facilities must be
prepared to meet the medical and psychological needs of pregnant addicts and help
the women deal with social service issues such as transportation and childcare.137
Experts report that drug addiction can best be treated through full service treatment
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532 U.S. at 90. Justice Kennedy went on to say that the testing ought not to be
invalidated if prosecuting authorities then adopt “legitimate procedures” to discover the test
results and prosecution follows. Id.
136
In Ferguson v. City of Charleston, the record suggested that the discretionary testing
resulted in protocol that “disproportionately targeted indigent, African-American women.”
Brief of Petitioners at 12, Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (No. 99-936).
137
See Brief of Amici Curiae National Abortion Rights League, et al., at 13-17, Ferguson
v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001) (No. 99-936) (describing the essential elements for
effective treatment of pregnant drug addicts).

32

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 17:11

that combines behavior and pharmacological therapies with social service
interventions.138
The government should take various steps to insure the availability of adequate
treatment facilities. First, the government should require that state funded medical
programs assist individuals who cannot afford drug treatment. With regard to
privately funded health care, state regulators could require that health insurance
policies cover the cost of treatment programs.
In connection with this legislation, steps must also be taken to eliminate all
barriers to drug treatment facilities. The government should prohibit treatment
centers from discriminating against pregnant women. Treatment centers that have
refused to treat pregnant women claim that they cannot risk the potential liability
exposure of treating pregnant women. This problem needs to be addressed.139
VII. SIGNIFICANT ADVANTAGES OF THE PROPOSAL
The obvious advantage of this proposal is that it is intended to secure treatment
for pregnant women who are addicted. This proposal approaches drug addiction as a
serious public health problem that merits government intervention. Unlike
“backward looking” legislation which punishes women for drug use, this proposed
legislation requires drug education and facilitates treatment by providing for formal
drug counseling and intervention by trained personnel. Such a proposal is consistent
with a woman’s duty to herself, as well as her duty to society.
Unlike civil commitment or criminal legislation that may deter treatment, the
proposed legislation encourages treatment.140 This is significant because pregnancy
appears to be a “window of opportunity” for treating addiction. In interviews with
150 drug-using mothers in New York City, three fourths of those interviewed
reported concern for their children as the major motivation for initiating treatment.141
Formal intervention and counseling provided by trained persons should strengthen
this motivation.
In treating drug addiction as a disease that requires medical and social service
intervention, the proposal does not undermine the physician-patient relationship.
Instead, the program reinforces the relationship by requiring that physicians provide
information on drug addiction and treatment to improve both maternal and fetal
health. As stated by the American Medical Association,
[W]hen physicians and patients work together, with a shared goal of
achieving the best possible outcome for mother and child, outcomes are
improved. With appropriate prenatal counseling, women will reduce the
138
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impact of their addiction on their fetuses . . . A drug-testing policy truly
committed to reducing harm to children in utero would, therefore,
encourage frank and full communication between patient and physician.142
In requiring counseling, consensual testing, and the availability of treatment, the
proposed program is intended to foster communication and facilitate treatment.
Because physicians only perform testing following client consent, physicians guard
the confidences of patients, only providing information to public health authorities.143
With this approach, testing is a tool of treatment, not a tool of criminal enforcement.
This enables physicians to work together with their patients and public health experts
in treating addiction as a disease.
Finally, the policy behind this proposal goes beyond an attempt to legislate
morality. Unlike some paternalistic legislation that prevents persons from harming
themselves, this proposal is designed to prevent a mother from harming society and
the unborn child, who is a future member of the community. In most cases, the
community has to bear the financial burden of caring for the infant who suffers the
effects of prenatal drug use. In addition to the state’s financial interest, the state also
has an interest in prohibiting the gestational use of drugs because that behavior can
cause permanent damage to future members of the community. Therefore, even
assuming that one’s own use of drugs such as cocaine is legalized, society would still
have an interest in curbing drug use by pregnant women. With that approach, what
is relevant is the harm to society and the unborn child, not the harm to the mother
herself. In that event, the principal public policy justification is that intervention is
appropriate to curb drug use that inflicts damage on society.
VIII. UTILITARIAN RECKONING
In consequentialist terms, the proposal appears to be beneficial in adopting a
medical model to facilitate the treatment of the disease of drug addiction, while not
discouraging prenatal and postnatal care. This ultimately benefits the woman and the
community, as well as the unborn child. Experts report that treatment also helps the
woman’s other children.144 In various ways, treatment also benefits the state and
community. If women are treated, astronomical costs of caring for drug-addicted
infants can be avoided. The avoidance of these medical costs would benefit those
private insurance companies that provide medical coverage for insured persons, as
well as the public assistance programs that provide funding for medical care to
indigent persons. Comparing the cost of drug treatment to the costs of neonatal
intensive care that averages approximately $2,000 per day, both the insurance
companies and government would be paying considerably less for drug treatment. If
women get treatment, states could also avoid the continued expenses of caring for
children who are more likely to be mentally and physically impaired.
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In addition to reducing the specific costs associated with prenatal drug use,
treatment reduces other costs associated with drug use.145 For example, studies have
revealed that drug treatment reduces drug use by forty to sixty percent, significantly
decreasing criminal activity associated with drug use.146 Conservative estimates
indicate that every one dollar invested in addiction treatment programs results in a
return of between four and seven dollars in reduced drug-related crime, criminal
justice costs, and theft alone. Finally, the community and individuals benefit when
treatment reduces interpersonal conflicts, improves workplace productivity, and
reduces drug-related accidents.147
An additional feature of the legislation requiring testing and counseling
intervention is that it effectively requires that the government take steps to insure that
treatment be available. The legislation could only be enforced if treatment is
available and affordable.
Admittedly, under the proposed legislation women may not consent to testing.
Even those women who refuse testing will benefit from receiving counseling and
information on drug treatment. To gauge the effectiveness of the intervention
program, the legislation could require that medical providers report statistics on the
number of women who refuse testing.
Opponents of legislation might still assert that any intervention infringes on a
woman’s liberty and personal autonomy. Given the fact that information and
possible treatment would also benefit the woman, such infringement seems
reasonable under the circumstances. Finally, from a communitarian perspective,
community-based drug treatment programs help individuals develop as responsible
members of the community.148 As compared to other types of intervention or
inaction, such an approach is “far less costly, far more humane, and most importantly
it offers a far greater chance of success.”149
IX. CONCLUSION
Prenatal drug use is a health care problem that merits appropriate government
action. Given the societal interest in curbing drug use, such action can be taken
without recognizing “fetal rights.” For years the medical community has opposed
criminal prosecutions and legislation targeting prenatal drug use. Instead, medical
experts have urged that drug addiction be treated as a disease. The proposed
legislation takes such an approach in providing education, testing, counseling
intervention, and treatment services in an effort to curb prenatal drug use. The
proposal can be justified on the basis of utilitarian theory in that the legislation
serves the interests of both the mother and community.150
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Legislators who desire to eradicate prenatal drug use must make a concerted
effort to provide the treatment that mothers desperately need. In discussing the clash
of rights between the pregnant woman and her fetus, one commentator states that it is
difficult to determine who will emerge victorious.151 All parties could emerge
victorious if the government treats drug addiction as a public health problem
meriting intervention.
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